The term "independence of the judiciary" carries twa meanings: the independence of individual judges in the exercise of their judicial functions, and the independence of the judicirary as a body. The former is composed of two elements -(a) in the process of decision-making and in exercising their incidental official duties, they owe allegiance to the lawand to no other authority; and (b) that their term of office and tenure are adequately secured Interference with the independence of individual judges is regarded as highly reprehensible. Interference with the independence of the judiciary as a body has additionally an impact on individual judges in the discharge of their duties. The traditions and corporate responsibility which the inGtitution of the judiciary inspires in the individual judgcs reinforce their individual idependence.
The resi stanCG of the judiciary to governmental incursions up on that discrete function in the administration of justice is as crucial to judges as is their detachment frompolitical considerations of the individual decision-making process.
The primary provision designed to secure the independenc3 of judges in both senses is judical tenure. Historically in England Parliament was less motivated by a commitment to judicial independence than by the political considerations of curbing the powers of the Sovereign. Whether the motiye the legislation had in establishing the judicial" oath, which provided that judges should swear that they need not receive any fee or present from any party to a case befüre the courts, except from the Sovereign who paid their salaries, played a vital role in both improving judiciai standards as well as reducing the influence of the Sovereign over the judges and the judicial process.
Ultimately in the second half of the 17th century the judges were decreed by the Act of Settlement in 1688 to hold office "quamdiu se bene gesseriut". Apart from the power of removal from office by resolution of both Houses of Pa,rliament, which has not occurred in modern times, the judges of the High Court are quasi-inemovable.
Although the judges of the two hwer rungs of the judicial le,ddcr -the Crown Court judges and the Magistracy -are removable in certain legislatively defined circumstances, there is still a high degree of security of tenure. Since the lower judiciary, in general, funetions subject to the control and supervision of the higher judiciary, there is less need for quasi-irremovability of the former. Judicial promotion in England is vicwed as being inconsistent with judicial indcpendence. Deeisions by a judge are said to be influeneed by the expectation that those favourable to government will induce official preferment.
Mr. Bloom-Cooper later explained the judicial profession (Magistrature) in France, he spoke about the inelegance, not to say impropriety of electing judges to office (best scen in the United States,)
He said that the Judicial Studies Board which is in existence for last 7-8 years in not training judges in United Kingdam.
As a general rule the conduct of judges cannot be discussed in Parliament unless upon a substantive motion which admits a distinct vote of the House. Likewise matters that are currently proceeding in the eourts are sub judice and cannot be debated in Parliament until theyare concluded.
He said there is a tension today between judges and Parliament a decision can not be repealed but an act of Parliament can be repealed during the discussions the French participants criticized him saying that the information given in the report about French judicial profession \'vas not up to date.
Prof, Dr, F, Kübler, professor at Johann Vvolfgang Goethe University presented a Report an "The Role of the judge in a changing Society". He said that his report is centred on the nation of "Verrechtlihung" which can only be translated by "legislation" or "juridification" in a very inadequate way. "Verechlichung" means more that the permanent increase of law a change in quantity it includes the continuing penetration of social institution by law a process which changes the quality of not only the legal system but also of the human relations which become affected.
The report was divided into four parts. The first part covers the identification of some major elements of social change stimulating "Verrechtlichung" such as technical revolution, the economic development, the political environment of modern legal systems and the cultural change. In the second part the rapporteur indicates how these changes affect the regulatory functions of the legal system, the emphasis in laid on the diversification of rule making powers. In the third part Dr. Külber answers the question what is the function of the judiciary in such a system. This transformation of the legal system from a simple and static structure granting legal stability to a complicated machi-[VOL. XX nery designed for the purpose of securing and promoting stable sodial development by legal change has deeply affected the role of the judge: the courts had to step in with rule making of their own in order to fill the grops left ofen by the inevitable shortcomings of a much more complex regulatory process. In the fourth and the last part Dr. Kübler explains how these change actually or potentially affect the mechanisms of judicial accountability.
There are mechanisms as the appeal system which works inside the judiciary and mechanisms or measures such as disciplinary proceedings, the selection and promotion of judges outside the judiciary. Also growing interest of the public. Here the emphasis has moved from more legal to more political forms of control. Mr.F.Morozzo della Rocca, Deputy to the Procureur G€neral at the Court of Cassatian (Roma) presented on June 18 his report on "the different forms of personal liability of the judge". The report was on the different forms of personal liability of the judge for acts done and word s spoken in the exercise of his (or her) functions alsa for behaviour when not exercising judicial functions which might adversely affect the honour and dignity of the profession.
The rapporteur points out that nowhere the limits of the liability of the judge amount to a complete immunity. Same offences are specifically connected by the exercise of judicial functions, so that they can only be committed by a judge, abuse of one's functions is usually regarded as an aggravating circumstance in the case of ordinary offenc=s artieles 127, 183 and 185 of the French criminal code artiele 328 of the !talian criminal code artiele 334 and 336 of the criminal code of the Federal Republic of Germany, articles 351-385 of the Spanish criminal code are cited.
As to civilliability it is impossible to speak of a judge's Hability with respect to acts performed lawfully and without fault although they may be objectively unjust.
The solution which legal experience has suggested may be elassified as follows :
As regards substantive law: cl the state is direetly liable for the judge's faults subject to an action in indemnity against the judge. as regards procedure a) no special form is provided and the procedure is governed by the general rules bL previous authorisation is necessary cl the jurisdiction and procedure are governed by special rules.
Beside criminal and civil liabilities there is also disciplinary control which seems to be incompatible with the principle of independence. However, the European tradition either to sanction misconduct by members of the association who are judged by their peers or with the objeet of enabling the professions to work out specific rules of professional conduct. The judge is disciplinary control can not be defended by a lawyer but by another judge. Mr. DeHa Rocca is against non publicity of the debates. He says that even The Court of Human Rights decided the publicity of the audience.
In the end of his report Mr. DeHa Rocca asks the following q uestions :
In it desirable that the state should accept the civi! liability in the faults of judges when the tendency of the judiciary is to establish compIete separation?
Is the judge's personal liability perhaps the price he must pay in his independence? Does disciplinary control within the judiciary itself favour the establishment of the judiciary as a seperate body?
What is the effect of the absence of statutorily defined punishable offences on the independence of a judge, in relation on the judiciary?
On June 19 Mr.J.Velu advocate general attached to Th3 Court de Cassation <Erussels), also professor at he Free University of Brussels, presented his Report on "Essential elements for a legal regime governing public liability for judicial acts."
Mr. Velu, in his report pointed out the concept of public liabHity for judicial act which is the obligation of the public authorities to make good, damage caused by judicial acts. This system therefore has nothing to do with the personal liability (criminal disciplinary or civil) which may be incurred by officials who have performed judicial acts causing damage and which may arise either from the principal actions brought by the victim himself or from an action for indemnity brought by a public authority.
The concept of judicial acts is not easy to determine, it can be defined as "anyaction or omission of a judicial nature occuring in the administration of justice by all the public bodies Constitutionally entrusted therewith".
Later, he exposed the rules of traditional international law in liability for judicial acts.
The state to whom an act unlawful in international law is imputable must make reparation to the State against whom this act has been committed. The damage for which reparation is due is the harm caused either to a national of the State or to the State itself or to both.
The international liability arises from any internationally unlawful act of State which implies first conduct consisting of an act or omission attributable to the State under International Law Cimputability) and secondly that this conduet amounts to aviolation of an international obligation of the State (unla\\fulness).
Later Mr. Velu, studied the rules of liability for judicial acts in the law of international instruments relating to human rights.
These instruments are European Canvention on Human Rights, Protocal and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Right of reparation is created in case of an unlawful act.
Right to indemnification is created in case of a judicia! error. In the conelusion, Mr. Velu proposes five principles by which the member States of the Council of Europe could be guided in their lawand practice.
Principle ı
Reparation for damage caused by a judicial act due to. the fault of the person (or body) performing the act should be guaranteed in the following cases: a. When as the result of a judicial act a person has suffered damage because he has been arrested or detained in conditions contrary to the provisions of Artiele 5 (l) to (4) 
Principle il
Even in the absence of the faults referred to in Principle i the reparatian of the damage caused by a judicial act should be guaranteed in the following cas es : a. When the damage arises from detention on remand not followed by a conviction and it would be anifestly unjust if the victim were left to bear the damage alone.
b. When the damage arises from a sentence served as a result of a final conviction and this conviction has later been set aside or apardon granted because new facts or newly revealed facts proved that there has been a miscarriage of justice, unless it is proved that the failure to diselose the unknown fact in time is due in whole or in part to the fault of the convicted person.
Principle III
if the victim has contributed to the damage the reparatian may be reduced or refused.
Principle IV
The reparatian provided for in Principle i should be complete, the heads of damage and the nature and type of reparatian being amatter for domestic law.
The reparatian provided for in Principle II may cover part of the damage only, as may be required by equitable principles.
Principle V
The victim's rights deriving from the rules on public libality for judicial acts should be guaranteed without any discnmination based Onter alia) on sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or any other opinions, national or social ongin, membership of a national minonty, wealth, birth or any other situation.
